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1. Abstract 
 
The determinants of sovereign credit rating are becoming increasingly more important as many 
rating agencies have been more active in adjusting their ratings. Our paper analyzed the 
determinants based on Standard & Poor’s sovereign credit ratings, for the period 1995-2009. Using 
a linear regression framework, we examined several variables under the political, economic, 
external, fiscal and monetary categories. The relationship between each determinant was analyzed 
by isolating each credit rating, and by further employing transformation on specific variables. The 
results indicate a good performance of the estimated model with a high level of fit. GDP per capita, 
inflation, default history and advanced economic regions have a significant impact on a country’s 
credit rating.   
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2. Introduction 
 
Standard & Poor’s (S&P) defines sovereign credit ratings as the willingness and ability of 
the sovereign (central government) to repay its financial obligation to commercial creditors on time 
and in full. Sovereign credit ratings are instrumental in determining borrowing costs for central 
governments in international markets. Another reason sovereign ratings are important are various 
funds may have constraints in place regarding  the quality of sovereigns they are able to hold, for 
example, the Student Investment Advisory Service (SIAS) is restricted from purchasing bonds 
lower than BBB quality. Also, by virtue of association sovereign ratings can affect the ratings of 
financial institutions and companies that are domiciled in that country. Finally, credit ratings help 
guide and manage institutional and retail investors’ fixed income portfolio composition based on 
the credit risk of the sovereign perceived through their credit rating. It is imperative given the 
volatile economic climate and as we witness numerous sovereigns being downgraded by the three 
main rating agencies, S&P, Moody’s, and Fitch, that we understand what factors are driving these 
ratings.  
This paper looks at the determinants of the credit ratings using empirical analysis of foreign-
currency sovereign debt ratings. This is done by performing OLS estimation on various 
fundamental macroeconomic variables following S&P’s model. We chose to use S&P’s model for 
our research because, based on our reference paper’s analysis, the significance of their variables 
were the closest aligned to what are most relevant during this critical economic time. Also, it is one 
of the most well established rating agencies and has received a lot of media attention recently for 
their U.S. downgrade.  
The extension of this paper updates and compares the predicable power of the time period 
employed in our reference paper, Alfonso, Gomes, and Rother (2010).  The precedent paper used a 
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time period of 1995-2005; however, using our model we forecasted out to 2010 from 2005. The 
main reason for this is to capture the effects of a severe financial crisis, in 2008, and observe 
whether there have been drastic changes in the determinants of the ratings during that time. This 
time period analyzed spans over multiple economic and political cycles.  
Our empirical analysis is completed by performing OLS estimation, as was done in our 
precedent paper. The benefits of using OLS estimation are its simplicity and efficiency to 
manipulate to fixed or random effect models. Prior to the regression analysis, we examined each 
determinant in detail and studied the relationship between the determinant itself and the credit 
rating. We also analyzed the variation in ratings and their determinants by performing sub-period 
analysis and testing out of sample. The goal of sub-period analysis is to validate the process of 
using panel data in pooled OLS.  We have also added value in our paper by transforming variables 
and extending the linearity to a higher order if necessary. 
When back-testing the transformed model was used, it did an excellent job at explaining the 
sovereign credit ratings with an  of 98%. The results seemed fairly consistent with those found in 
our reference paper and S&P methodology. For example, based on our model we found GDP per 
capita to be the single greatest explanatory variable and the key variable used by S&P to derive 
credit ratings. A significant observation in our results is a notable difference in GDP growth. 
Alfonso, Gomes, and Rother (2010) observed a positive correlation between GDP growth and credit 
ratings; however, while our analysis showed a positive correlation between GDP growth and credit 
ratings, the variable was found to be insignificant.  
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3. Literature Review 
 
The topic of our paper is a very timely one as we are currently witnessing many sovereign’s 
credit ratings fall. We also witnessed the United States’ very first credit rating decrease since 
Standard & Poor’s began assigning credit ratings on January 1, 1975. During this very turbulent 
time in the global economy and in discussing possible topics with Jean-Francois Tardif, we decided 
to take a closer look at the methodology employed by the ratings agency when assigning and 
managing credit ratings. This was done by performing a regression analysis against macroeconomic 
variables to the sovereign credit ratings. Then through reverse engineering we determined which 
variables S&P considers the most significant, this enabled us to forecast future ratings with a degree 
of accuracy. There have been a few papers written in the past couple of decades on this topic, each 
providing slight improvements to their models. 
 
S&P – “Sovereign Government Rating Methodology And Assumptions” 
It was imperative for us to first look at how S&P derives their sovereign ratings. They do 
not divulge the specifics on their model; however, they have recently increased its transparency. 
S&P – “Sovereign Government Rating Methodology And Assumptions” was used to analyze the 
methodology employed by S&P in deriving sovereign credit ratings. This paper tells us S&P uses 
five essential factors to come up with the rating; they are Political, Economic, External, Fiscal, and 
Monetary.  Chart 1 provides a summarized overview of S&P’s Sovereign rating framework. 
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Chart 1 – S&P’s Sovereign Rating Framework 
Sovereign Inicative Rating Level
Exceptional Adjustment Factors
Foreign Currency Sovereign Rating
Local Currency Sovereign Rating
Zero to two notches of uplift
Monetary 
Flexibility 
Fiscal performance 
and flexibility, as 
well as debt 
burden
External Liquidity 
and International 
Investment 
Position
Economic 
Structure and 
Growth Prospects
Political and Economic 
Profile
Flexibility and Performance 
Profile
Institutional 
Effectiveness and 
Political Risks
Political Score Economic Score External Score Fiscal Score Monetary Score
 
 
Each score is derived from a number of qualitative and quantitative factors, based on a rating from 
1 to 6, with 1 being the strongest. The factors used to derive the five primary scores in the S&P 
model are summarized below; these factors are either qualitative or quantitative factors.  
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Table 1 – S&P’s Sovereign Credit Rating Factors 
Score Factors Qualitative/Quantitative
Political Effectiveness, stability, and predictability of sovereign's policymaking and political institutions Qualitative
Transparency and accountability of institutions, data, and processes, as well as the coverage 
and reliability of statistical information
Government's payment culture Qualitative
External security risks Qualitative
Economic Income levels Quantitative
Growth prospects Quantitative
Economic diversity and volatility Quantitative
External Status of a sovereign's currency in international transactions Quantitative
Country's external liquidity Quantitative
Country's external indebtedness Quantitative
Fiscal Nominal general government debt as a percentage of GDP (Fiscal Performance) Quantitative
Fiscal flexibility, long-term fiscal trends, and vulnerabilities Qualitative
Sustainability of sovereign's debt level Quantitative
Monetary Ability to use monetary policy to address domestic economic stresses particularly through its
control of money supply and domestic liquidity conditions
Credibility of monetary policy, measured by inflation Quantitative
Effectiveness of mechanisms for transmitting the effect of monetary policy decisions 
to the real economy
Qualitative
Qualitative
Quantitative
 
As noted above the political factors are essentially all qualitative, while the other scores are 
mainly quantitative. Also, note that fiscal score reveals the sustainability of a sovereign’s deficits 
and debt burden, with the two segments are scored separately. Fiscal score is calculated as the 
average of fiscal performance and flexibility and debt burden. Also, monetary score reflects 
whether the monetary authority can support sustainable economic growth and shocks, it is a useful 
stabilization tool for economically instable sovereign states.  
These scores derive the aggregated profiles. The political and economic score determine the 
political and economic profile, which reflects S&P’s view of the resilience of the nation’s economy, 
strength and stability of government institutions, and effectiveness of policy-making. The external, 
fiscal, and monetary score make-up the flexibility and performance profile, which reflects S&P’s 
view of the sustainability of government’s fiscal balance, debt burden, and fiscal and monetary 
flexibility. The combined score from the political and economic profile and flexibility and 
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performance profile is used to derive the sovereign indicative rating. S&P generally applies a 
foreign-currency sovereign rating within one notch of the indicative rating based on the nation’s 
positioning relative to its peers. The exceptional adjustment factors can deviate foreign-currency 
sovereign rating by more than one notch due to several reasons, notably very high political risk and 
high debt burden. Thus, a political score of 6 coupled with a debt score of 5-6 will receive a max 
rating of BB+ due to an unfavourable track record of sovereigns defaulting given poor levels in 
political and debt scores. Local-currency sovereign rating can be greater than foreign-currency 
sovereign rating due to individual powers within the sovereign’s own borders supporting higher 
creditworthiness, such as issuance of local currency and regulatory control of their financial system. 
An example of this is Mexico, as of June 30, 2011 their local-currency rating was A, but their 
foreign-currency rating was BBB. Note that when a sovereign is a member of a union, ie. European 
Union, or when a sovereign uses another’s currency, local-currency sovereign rating equals foreign-
currency sovereign rating.   
Recently, due to historical defaults, the effect of the 2008-2009 financial crisis, and the 
credit strength of certain sovereign governments, S&P has calibrated their sovereign rating criteria 
and believe that sovereign ratings are now more comparable with other S&P ratings across different 
sectors.  
  
Richard Cantor and Frank Packer – “Determinants and Impact of Sovereign Credit Ratings” 
As early as the 1990s the demand for credit ratings increased dramatically as sovereigns 
increased their appetite for risk and more corporations domiciled in riskier nations began to borrow 
in international bond markets. This led to the determination of what selected criteria is employed by 
the rating agencies in order to derive their credit rating. This paper looked at eight popular variables 
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that were repeatedly seen as determinants. These variables included: Per capita income, GDP 
growth, Inflation, Fiscal balance, External balance, External debt, Economic development, and 
Default history. Per capita income, inflation, and external debt all demonstrated high explanatory of 
a high rating. GDP growth, fiscal balance and external balance did not have a strong correlation to 
ratings. Using ordinary least squares to model the eight variables to S&P and Moody’s ratings the 
model explained 90% of the sample with a 1.2 notch standard error. The results presented 
impressive observations, such as the ability to predict large differences among ratings, ie. AAA vs. 
BB+ (S&P), but lacked in explaining small differences, ie. Ba2 vs. Baa3 (Moody’s). The paper 
found all variables significant except for fiscal and external balances, which can be due to the 
market placing poor credit risks in stronger fiscal and external balance positions creating a low 
significance in these variables. Moody’s and S&P place similar importance on the majority of the 
variables tested, with S&P placing a notable greater importance on per capita income, GDP growth, 
and default history.  
Cantor and Packer (1996) also analyzed the correlation between credit spreads and ratings. 
They found that given public information, the determinants did a great job explaining the sovereign 
ratings; as a result, ratings were highly correlated to credit spreads. 
  
Antonio Alfonso, Pedro Gomes, Philipp Rother – “Short and-Long-Run Determinants of 
Sovereign Debt Credit Ratings” 
In determining which factor variables the main three rating agencies, S&P, Moody’s, and 
Fitch, emphasized on in deriving their credit ratings, our reference paper was extremely useful. 
Alfonso, Gomes, and Rother (2010) looked at the effects of macroeconomic variables across the 
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rating agencies over the short and long-term. They also looked at how the firms calculated rating 
upgrades and downgrades. 
 The methods used in the reference paper to model the variables in determining foreign-
currency sovereign debt ratings included linear regression transformation and OLS estimation, 
random effects estimation, ordered probit and random effects ordered probit methods. The latter 
methods are more advanced in that they consider a normally distributed cross-section error. The 
ordered probit method assumes that the differences in credit ratings are not linear, which is also 
assumed by random effects estimation.  
 The paper utilized the time period from 1995 – 2005 when analyzing the data. The results 
showed that four variables have the largest effect in the short-term, GDP per capita, real GDP 
growth, public debt level, and government balance. Key long-term determinants were government 
effectiveness, external debt, and external reserves. 
 As evidenced in the paper, the benefits to using linear transformation is its simplicity and 
ability to use fixed and random effects estimation; however, it does have drawbacks as mentioned 
above, the assumption that the difference between ratings are linear. By using ordered probit to 
address this issue, another issue arises, ordered probit asymptotic properties do not generalize for a 
small sample and adjusting for panel data is complex due to a country specific effect. As a result, 
this paper looked at both methods and compared their results. 
 The explanatory variables employed in this paper were grouped into four categories: 
Macroeconomic, government, external, and other. These are similar to the categories S&P uses. 
Macroeconomic variables include GDP per capita, real GDP growth, unemployment, and inflation. 
Both models (random effects estimation and ordered probit) showed GDP per capita was the most 
statistically significant variable across all rating agencies; this is consistent with S&P’s 
12 
 
methodology as their key driver for economic score is GDP per capita. The other three variables 
varied in terms of significance across the three rating agencies. Government variables include 
government debt, government balance, and government effectiveness. Results showed that both 
government debt and government balance were very significant across both models and rating 
agencies.  Government effectiveness was significant within S&P and Fitch’s models using both 
methods. S&P methodology places a great deal of weight on general government debt in their fiscal 
score category, so it makes sense this variable was statistically significant at the 1% level in both 
models. External variables consist of external debt, current account, and reserves. The random 
effects estimation results showed slight statistical significance (10% level) in external debt for S&P 
and Moody’s but Fitch found it extremely significant (1% level). External debt demonstrated less 
significance in the ordered probit model for S&P and Fitch, but more significant for Moody’s. 
Current account showed equal significance between models, with Moody’s placing the greatest 
significance among rating agencies, followed by S&P, and Fitch. Reserves were only found to be 
significant with Moody’s. S&P’s external score category showed that external debt and reserves 
were not overly significant using the random effects model, but was found to be significant using 
the averages (long-term) of external debt and reserves variables in the ordered probit model, 
implying these variables were more relevant at explaining the long-term effects rather than short-
term effects of the sovereign credit rating. The variables in the other variables category include 
default history, years since default, European Union, and regional dummies. Default history proved 
to be a very statistically significant variable among all rating agencies and both models. This proves 
that a sovereign who has defaulted before will be more willing to default again relative to a 
sovereign that has never defaulted. 
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 The explanatory power, , using the random effects estimation was extremely high for all 
rating agencies, for both the unrestricted and restricted (omitting statistically insignificant variables) 
versions, at roughly 95% for each. The paper found more significant explanatory variables for 
Moody’s and S&P, with a great deal of overlap between firms. Also tested in our reference paper 
was the effect of sub-periods. Sub-periods were used to test the robustness of the model during 
different time periods in history. For example, various economic cycles can likely differentiate the 
results of the model. The greatest difference during the 1996-2000 time period was current account 
was more important, whereas external reserves was more significant during 2001-2005. 
 Alfonso, Gomes, Rother (2010) proved the linear specification used in the ordered probit 
model is acceptable for data regression, meaning the rating notches for all three agencies are 
essentially equally distributed across the ratings range. They also demonstrated that OLS estimation 
is an acceptable and successful method when modelling explanatory variables in this case. The only 
small discrepancy lies at the lower end of the ratings range for Moody’s and S&P, they observe the 
ratings spread widens when sovereigns are crossing the threshold from speculative grade to 
investment grade.  
Our literature review has given us a great framework and foundation as to the derivation of 
sovereign credit rating methodology employed by S&P, as well as, providing insight into the 
various models used to explain the predictive and explanatory power of the macroeconomic, 
government, external, and other variables. In light of those results, we have decided to use OLS 
estimation as an acceptable and successful method when modelling our explanatory variables. 
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4. Methodology 
 
1. Credit Rating Dependent Variable and its Linear Transformation 
 
The framework employed to explain sovereign credit ratings is the following: the rating agency 
follows a continuous evolution of a country’s creditworthiness, denoted as an unobserved latent 
variable R*. This latent variable is assumed to have linear dependence over a set of explanatory 
variables. A simple example of this linear relationship is shown in equation (1).   
 
(1)  
From this latent variable, the rating agency assigns a letter credit rating based on a set of 
cut-off points, c1 to c16, shown in equation (2) 
 
(2) 
Our paper focuses on the reverse engineering portion of the credit rating. We utilized the 
available sovereign credit ratings provided by Standard & Poor’s. Based on the panel data, we 
studied the dependent relationship of the credit ratings to a wide range of explanatory variables, 
including macroeconomics, government, historical and regional factors. As the literature review has 
indicated, a linear transformation of credit rating provided a good fit and a great predictive power. 
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Further studies also verified that the underlying assumption of equally spaced numerical scale is 
valid. We adopted the linear transformation credit rating for this paper as shown in table 1. 
Table 2 – S&P rating system and linear transformation 
 
Characterization of 
 debt and issuer 
  
Rating Linear  Transformation 
S&P Scale 17 
Highest quality 
In
ve
st
m
en
t g
ra
de
 
AAA 17 
High quality 
AA+ 16 
AA 15 
AA- 14 
Strong payment capacity 
A+ 13 
A 12 
A- 11 
Adequate payment 
capacity 
BBB+ 10 
BBB 9 
BBB- 8 
Likely to fulfill 
obligation,  
ongoing uncertainty 
Sp
ec
ul
at
iv
e 
gr
ad
e 
BB+ 7 
BB            6 
BB- 5 
High credit risk 
B+ 4 
B 3 
B- 2 
Very high credit risk 
CCC+ 
1 
CCC 
CCC- 
Near default with 
possibility of recovery 
 of recovery 
CC 
 
Default 
SD 
D 
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2. Explanatory Variables 
 
We have focused primarily on variables which explain the quantitative aspect due to the 
subjectivity, complexity, and difficulty to effectively input qualitative variables into our model. 
Although, we believe some qualitative factors can be explained through overlap in other variables. 
As was done in our reference paper, we also used the government effectiveness (included in 
political score) variable in our model. Based on historical data it is evident that a strong economic 
structure with sustainable economic growth provides a strong revenue base, boosts debt capacity, 
and enhances fiscal and monetary policy flexibility. As a result, market economies have been 
proven to promote higher levels of wealth due to increased efficiency in resource allocation leading 
to sustainable long-term growth. The most significant economic variable used in our reference 
paper and S&P’s methodology (in the economic score category) is GDP per capita, which we also 
used. External score, which looks at a country’s ability to generate receipts from abroad to pay its 
obligations to non-residents, was captured through the external debt and reserves variables. Fiscal 
score reveals the sustainability of a sovereign’s deficits and debt burden, with the two segments 
scored separately. The key variables we employed from this segment were general government debt 
stock and government balance.  
Based on our literature review and industry analysis, we targeted a full list of macroeconomic 
variables we believe will successfully explain the S&P model in deriving sovereign credit ratings. 
Below we listed the variables used in the 12-variable set model; the list contains the relationship on 
the ratings, a brief description, and the data source.  
 
 
 
17 
 
Table 3 – Explanatory Variables 
 
Macroeconomic Variables 
Score Variable Definition Correl. Data Source 
Qual. 
or 
Quant. 
Included in  
Variable 
Set 
12 Var. 
Economic GDP per capita 
Measures nation's income level 
and ability to pay down their 
debt obligations 
+ IMF WEO  NGDPDPC Quant.  
Economic Real GDP growth 
Increases sovereign's ability to 
repay their debt obligations 
quicker through increased 
production 
+ IMF WEO  NGDPDPC Quant.  
Economic Unemployment 
Increased unemployment 
unfavourable to advanced 
economies as this decreases 
government revenues and 
social program costs hindering 
sovereign nations ability to pay 
their outstanding debt levels 
- IMF WEO LUR Quant.  
Monetary Inflation  
Higher inflation rates are most 
prevalent in emerging 
economies, i.e. China. A higher 
inflation rate implies issues at 
the macroeconomic level; 
however, the silver lining is 
higher inflation levels decreases 
outstanding debt stock in 
domestic currency 
+/- IMF WEO PCPI Quant.  
Fiscal Government Debt 
Increased government debt 
over GDP will increase the 
sovereigns risk to fulfill its 
obligations to repay their debt 
stock, as this increases interest 
burden on the nation. 
- 
Jaimovich 
Panizza 
(2006) 
Quant.  
Fiscal Fiscal Balance 
Fiscal surplus has a positive 
effect on ratings since a surplus 
means the government is 
receiving more revenue than 
it's paying out in costs, hence 
enabling them to pay down 
their debt stock quicker. 
+ 
IMF WEO 
GGB, 
NGDPI 
Quant.  
Political Government Effectiveness 
Measures the sovereign’s 
competence of public service 
and historical commitment in 
paying down its debt 
obligations.  
+ WB AGI Qual.  
18 
 
External External Debt 
The greater the sovereign’s 
external debt level signifies an 
increase in default risk to 
foreign-currency as the 
sovereign takes on more debt 
to pay non-residents, as a 
result, creating additional fiscal 
pressure.  
- WB Quant.  
External Foreign Reserves 
The purpose of foreign reserves 
within central banks is to 
stabilize the domestic currency 
and used to pay for imports. 
The higher the foreign reserves 
the less likely the sovereign is 
to default on its outstanding 
foreign-currency debt 
+ 
World 
Gold 
Council 
Quant.  
External Gold Reserves 
Gold reserves are looked at 
similarly to Foreign Reserves. 
Gold is considered a monetary 
metal and excellent store of 
value; therefore it is used as a 
means to stabilize the 
sovereign’s domestic currency. 
+ 
World 
Gold 
Council 
Quant.  
External Total Reserves 
This aggregated variable 
measures the central 
governments total reserves 
held and provides a hedge 
against their domestic 
currency.  
+ 
World 
Gold 
Council 
Quant.  
External Current Account 
A current account surplus 
enables the sovereign to use 
proceeds from net exports, 
dividends, and net transfers to 
pay down their debt 
obligations. However, more 
notably in emerging economies 
a higher current account deficit 
could be due to an increase in 
spending on investments, 
leading to increased GDP 
growth in the long-term.  
+/- 
IMF WEO 
BCA, 
NGDPD 
Quant.  
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Economic 
Banks Total 
Liabilities over 
GDP 
Financial institutions can make-
up a large portion of a 
sovereign’s total debt. During 
the financial crisis, central 
governments have bailed out, 
and even nationalized, banks 
on the brink of defaulting. A 
high ratio hinders the 
sovereign’s ability to pay debt 
obligations and leads to an 
increase in default risk. 
- Bloomberg Quant.  
Political Default History 
Historical defaults among 
sovereigns can signify 
acceptance of default on 
sovereign debt as a means to 
clear or reset their economy.  
- S&P Qual.  
Political Years since default 
The longer the period since 
default is favourable to credit 
ratings as credibility among 
central government increases.  
+ S&P Quant.  
Political European Union 
Sovereigns that are members of 
the European Union follow 
strict regulations on economic 
policy and monitored by the 
European Central Bank. Also, 
the adopted currency, Euro, 
among member countries 
provides a natural hedge to 
domestic currency.  
+ WB Qual.  
Note: The negative relationship indicates the slope of the estimated linear regression is negative, 
while a positive relationship indicates a positive slope. 
 
3. Regression Framework 
 
An earlier study conducted by Monfort and Mulder (2000) and Mora (2006) used a linear panel 
model as shown in equation 3. 
 
(3) 
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Where  
R – quantitative variable, obtained by a linear or by a non-linear transformation 
Xit – a vector containing time varying variables that includes the time-varying explanatory variables 
Zi  – a vector of time invariant variables that include regional dummies 
index i ( i  = 1, …, N) denotes the country 
index t (t = 1,…, T) indicates the period 
αi stands for the individual effects for each country i 
assumed that the disturbance   are independent across countries and across time 
 
In this paper, we will focus on two methods to estimate this equation: pooled ordinary least 
square (OLS) and fixed effects estimation. Pooled OLS is a general model that does not hold any 
prior statistic. This model can be improved by imposing an assumption where the error term is not 
uncorrelated with the regressors; specifically, the country specific error is correlated with some 
dependent variables . By incorporating this prior statistic, with a matrix of 
dummy variables, we generated the fixed effects model. 
  
For the pooled OLS estimation, we used the following model shown in equation (4) 
  (4) 
For the fixed effect model, we used the following model shown in equation (5) 
  (5) 
where 
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5. Empirical Analysis 
 
1. Data Source and Database Construction 
 
For the sovereign credit rating dependent variable, we created a database from 1995 to 2010 
based on S&P’s “Sovereign Rating and Country T&C Assessment Histories” report. There are four 
different rating categories: Local-Currency Long Time, Local-Currency Short time, Foreign-
Currency Long Time, and Foreign-Currency Short time. They are similar in score with foreign-
currency, with occasionally one to two notches lower than that of its local-currency counterpart. 
The time reference for each rating was taken as of December 31st of that year. In this paper, we 
focused on Foreign-Currency Long Time, which included 125 countries with a rating in 2010. From 
this database, we mapped the credit ratings into 17 categories, by combing all ratings below B- into 
one group (see table 2).  
   Detailed data sources and descriptions regarding the independent variables (the determinants) 
can be found in Table 3. A relational database was created to link multiple databases and variables. 
Observations that were missing values were retrieved but later dropped from the analysis. For 
example, since the values for government debt were scarce and the reserve variable was missing 
prior years, both variables were dropped from the study.  
 
2. Descriptive Statistics on Explanatory Variables 
Descriptive statistical analysis is a simple step of modeling yet it is often overlooked or omitted 
as it can be tedious and dull, should all assumptions be met. The purpose of this procedure is to 
validate the assumptions of the statistical model that we are using and modify ones that appears to 
be inappropriate. The basic building block of our model is a linear regression, and we needed to 
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verify that the relationship between the independent variables and dependent variable is indeed 
meaningful and linear. In the following paragraphs we will look into the credit rating dependent 
variable, the relationships between each independent variable and the dependent variable, and the 
violation of linearity and its transformation.  
 
Credit Rating Dependent Variable 
In figure 1, we can see that the total number of countries that are being rated steadily 
increased over time. The number of countries rated as speculative grade (BB or below) increased 
faster than that of courtiers rated as investment grade.  The average annual continuously compound 
rates of growth are 8.21% and 4.32% respectively. 
  
Chart 2 - Number of Sovereign Ratings by Grade Quality From 1995 - 2009 
 
 
In Chart 2, we observed that although the number of AAA grade countries does not change 
much (minimum of 16 and maximum of 21 in the past fifteen years), the percentage decreases 
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steadily over time. This is largely due to the increased number of countries rated as speculative 
grade. 
 
Chart 3. Percentage of Sovereign Ratings from 1995 – 2009 
 
 
The Relationships between Determinants and the Credit Rating Variable 
The relationship between each determinant and the credit rating variable was examined. 
This process involved verifying the relationship between the expected effect and the observed slope 
coefficient. The scatter plots for all variables can be found in Appendix 1. All variables were 
consistent with our expectation with the exception of the bank debt variable, which is a new 
variable we added to our model. Bank debt captured a portion of the country’s total debt. Total debt, 
including sovereign debt, private corporation debt and individual debt may be better suited for our 
study. This variable was dropped from the regression analysis as seen in the next section. 
In addition to the relationship between variables, the significance level is important. All 
variables are significant (p-value < 5%), except real GDP growth rate (p-value = 9.34%). This 
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means that the incorporation of this variable to the regression analysis in the next section is only 
marginally beneficial while it complicates the model.  
 
Table 4 – Significance of Independent Variables and the dependent Variable 
Determinant Name Effect Significance T-statistics P-values 
Default History 
Negative 
 19.67651 0 
Years Since the Last Default  14.92096 0 
Unemployment Rate  9.843321 0 
External Debt  9.651693 0 
Bank Debt  10.37427 0 
GDP per capita 
Positive 
 26.1915 0 
European Union  13.68423 0 
Industrial Countries  28.81488 0 
Fiscal Balance  6.138743 7.25E-10 
Government Effectiveness  4.807998 9.49E-07 
Real GDP Growth  1.321444 0.09341 
Inflation Uncertain  12.11208 0 
Current Account  4.914931 5.63E-07 
 
Note: The Significance box is checked when the p-value is smaller than 0.05 under Pearson 
Product-Moment Correlation Coefficient test.  
 
GDP Per Capita - Violation of Linearity and its Transformation 
GDP per capita is positively correlated with credit rating (as indicated with a positive slope), 
this is consistent with our prediction that high GDP per capita has a positive impact on ratings. In 
addition, the correlation between these two variables is high with R-square equal to 0.5154 as 
shown in Figure 3. However, from the scatter plot, we observe a recognizable non-linear pattern.  
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Chart 4. GDP per capita and Sovereign Credit Rating Scatter Plot (1995 – 2005) 
 
 
Several transformations were tested and we observed that the square root conversion yields 
the highest R-square (0.5993) as shown in Chart 5. 
Chart 5. Transformation: Squart root of GDP per capita and Sovereign Credit Rating 
Scatter Plot (1995 – 2005) 
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3. Regression Analysis and Results 
The procedure and the time period (1995-2005) for the following regression analysis is the same 
as that in the precedent paper, Alfonso (2007). The differences include the precedent paper using 
both long-term and short-term effects; however, we only focused on short-term effect. In addition, 
in the precedent paper, it had government debt and reserve variables which we did not include. 
Overall, there are 25 variables in the precedent paper and we only had 12 variables. Therefore, we 
would expect our R2 to be lower than that in the precedent paper.  
 
Full Model  
The results produced by the fixed effect model (R2 = 0.94) is better than that of pooled OLS 
(R2 = 0.76) (see Table 5). This is reasonable because there are more variables in fixed effects by the 
nature of its design. This is also consistent with the precedent paper where it had a higher R2 in 
fixed effect model than that in a pooled OLS model. (0.99 vs. 0.95). Overall, our model, by 
repeating the same procedure, yields a satisfactory result as we only used 12 variables whereas 
Afonso’s (2007) used 25 variables.   
In the following discussion, we divided explanatory variables into three categories in the 
context of our regression model: high explanatory power (p-value < 0.01); no explanatory power 
(p-value > 0.1); low explanatory power (0.01 < p-value < 0.1). Explanatory variables that had the 
highest explanatory power in both precedent paper and in our model were GDP per capita, inflation, 
default history dummy, and advanced economy. Explanatory variables that had low explanatory 
power in both precedent paper and in our model were GDP growth rate; external debt; and EU. 
Explanatory variables that had low explanatory power, but had high explanatory power in our 
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model and low or no explanatory power in another model, were unemployment rate; government 
balance; government effectiveness; current account; and since last default. 
The interpretation of no or low explanatory power cannot be generalized to the usefulness of 
such variable. This is because the credit rating does not necessarily explain the “real” probability of 
sovereign debt default, but rather S&P’s view of default probability. As we have learned from the 
literature review, rating agencies deem different variables to be important in explaining/predicting 
probability of default. For example, based on Afonso (2010) external debt is an important short-
term determinant for Moody’s, but not S&P. 
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Table 5 – Regression Coefficient Estimations and t-statistics for S&P 
 
  Pooled OLS   Fixed Effect 
  (1) Alfonso (2007)   (2) Alfonso (2007) 
Constant 8.567 4.521  6.392 10.301 
 (14.076)*** (3.64)***  (12.937)*** (136.51)*** 
GDP per capita 0.079 1.339   0.070 1.452 
 (6.131)*** (4.65)***  (5.252)*** (7.14)*** 
GDP growth -3.978 5.715  -0.467 8.221 
 (-1.267) (1.95)  (-0.236) (3.37)*** 
Unemployment rate -0.036 -1.450  0.059 0.062 
 (-1.528)* (-0.008)  (2.902)*** (2.63)*** 
Inflation -6.210 -0.586  -2.030 -0.219 
 (-5.381)*** (-2.39)***  (-2.486)*** (-5.33)*** 
Government Balance 0.085 5.892   0.081 4.430 
 (3.404)*** (1.81)*  (4.345)*** (2.01)** 
Government Effectiveness 8.487 0.385  7.635 0.371 
  (3.355)*** (1.30)   (4.498)*** (2.33)** 
External debt -1.232 -0.004  -8.741 -0.003 
 (-0.524) (-1.81)*  (-2.165)** (-1.65)* 
Current Account 0.026 -6.338  -0.043 -3.476 
 (1.451)* (-2.85)***  (-2.917)*** (-1.96)* 
Default Dummy -6.102 -1.032   -7.606 -1.353 
 (-9.807)*** (-3.62)***  (-12.636)*** (-5.48)*** 
Since Last Default 0.206 -0.010  0.592 -0.025 
 (2.366)*** (-0.31)  (4.725)*** (-0.34) 
Advanced Economy 3.564 2.446  4.771  -   
 (9.482)*** (8.24)***  (9.638)***  -  
EU 0.421 1.068  0.241 0.291 
 (1.572) (6.07)***  (0.593) (1.55) 
R2 0.759 0.951   0.935 0.987 
Observation 647 564   647 564 
 
Notes: the t statistics are in parenthesis. *,**,***- denoted statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1 
percent. The variables in bold denoted high explanatory power. 
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4. Back-Testing  
 
R2 in the context of a simple linear regression (one independent variable as shown under 
descriptive statistics section) indicates the relationship between two variables, whereas, R2 in the 
context of multiple linear regression (more than one independent variable as shown under 
regression analysis and results) indicates the goodness of fit for the model.  The direction of their 
relationship is measured by the sign in front of this parameter (either positive or negative) and the 
magnitude of their relationship is measured by its absolute value. In the back-testing analysis, we  
quantified the goodness of fit in a more intuitive approach. 
After we obtained the coefficients for the independent variables from the regression in the 
previous section, we plugged the entire database back into this equation to determine the quality of 
our estimations. There are two approaches for this test: in-sample analysis and out-of-sample 
analysis. In-sample analysis uses the same database that yields the regression coefficient and out-of-
sample analysis uses a new database that has not yet been employed by the regression. In both the 
precedent paper and our paper, we use 1995-2005 to generate the regression coefficients. For the 
out-of-sample analysis, we will use data from 2006-2009.  
Afonso’s (2010) in-sample analysis predicted roughly 98% accuracy within 1 ratings notch. Our 
transformed in-sample analysis estimated 88% were correctly predicted (approximately 99% within 
1 notch), but only 74% was accurately predicted (97% within 1 notch) for out-of-sample analysis.  
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Table 6 - Goodness of Fit: Back-Resting for both In- and Out-of-Sample Analysis 
Afonso (2010) In-Sample Analysis 
 Estimation Errors (notches)   
  5 4 3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3 -4 -5 Total 
Pooled OLS (count) 0 0 1 6 80 392 83 2 1 0 0 565 
Pooled OLS (%) 0% 0% 0% 1% 14% 69% 15% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 
             
Transformed In-Sample Analysis 
 Estimation Errors (notches)   
  5 4 3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3 -4 -5 Total 
Pooled OLS (count) 0 0 0 2 45 571 29 0 0 0 0 647 
Pooled OLS (%) 0% 0% 0% 0% 7% 88% 4% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 
             
Transformed Out-of-Sample Analysis 
 Estimation Errors (notches)   
  5 4 3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3 -4 -5 Total 
Pooled OLS (count) 0 0 0 6 30 246 48 3 0 0 0 333 
Pooled OLS (%) 0% 0% 0% 2% 9% 74% 14% 1% 0% 0% 0% 100% 
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6. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we studied the determinants of global sovereign debt ratings from Standard & 
Poor’s, for the period 1995-2009. The usage of regression analysis was popular to determine the 
unknown variables when the credit rating methodology was not transparent. Numerous studies have 
been published in a quest to solve this mystery. With increased transparency from the rating 
agencies in recent years, regression analysis has become a less useful tool in searching for the 
unknowns, but a method to compare different rating agencies based on a set of common 
determinants in a systematic approach.    
Our methodology was based on linear regression methods by means of pooled OLS and fixed 
effect estimation employed in the precedent paper. We also used the same twelve variables from the 
precedent paper and added two new variables. To expand, we examined each variable in detail and 
made transformations and added a higher order term when necessary. 
Descriptive statistical analysis is a simple yet important step to check model assumptions. 
Square root transformation of GDP per capita was introduced during this analysis. The rational for 
this transformation was to ensure linearity between the independent variables and dependent 
variable. The result of this transformation brought the explaining power of the fixed effect model 
from R2 = 0.94 to R2 =0.98. 
Our results showed GDP per capita, inflation, default history dummy, and advanced 
economy dummy are variables with high explanatory power shown in both our study and the 
precedent paper. GDP growth rate, external debt, and European Union region dummy are variables 
consistently shown to have no explanatory power in the context of our model. Unemployment rate, 
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government balance, government effectiveness, current account; and since last default are variables 
shown to have low explanatory power. 
With regards to back-testing in-sample analysis, 88% of our data was correctly predicted and 
99% was within one notch from the true credit rating, compared to only 69% correctly predicted in 
the precedent paper. The estimation power decreases to 74% correctly predicted and 97% within 
one notch for the out-of-sample analysis. This is satisfactory for two reasons as suggested in the 
precedent paper. 1) This model predominantly incorporated quantitative variables, while S&P stated 
they use both quantitative and qualitative variables. 2) This model used historical data but the rating 
agency often uses projected estimates, thus, a more comprehensive model with forward-looking 
numbers may improve the estimation power. 
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8. Appendix 
 
1. Relationship between Independent variables and dependent variable 
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